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____________________ 
 
 
 
ALITO, Circuit Judge: 
 
 The genesis of this appeal is a decision by the         
Commissioner of the Internal Revenue Service ("the Commissioner") 
to disallow certain deductions claimed by Charles and Margaret 
Nicholson on their 1983, 1984, 1985, and 1986 tax returns 
regarding computer equipment that Charles Nicholson acquired in 
1983.  The Commissioner maintained that the Nicholsons were not 
entitled to take the deductions because Charles Nicholson was not 
"at risk" regarding a promissory note that he gave in partial 
payment for the equipment.  Prior to a trial before the tax court 
on the propriety of these deductions, the parties settled on 
terms generally favorable to the Nicholsons.  The Nicholsons 
subsequently filed a motion for litigation costs pursuant to 
I.R.C. § 7430, arguing that the Commissioner's position in the 
underlying proceedings was not "substantially justified."  The 
tax court disagreed and refused to award litigation costs.  We 
now reverse and remand for further proceedings. 
 
I.0 
                                                           
0Because the underlying case was settled, there is no stipulation 
or other formal evidence pertaining to the transactions involved 
in this case.  See Nicholson v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1994-280 
at 3 n.2 (1994).  In this opinion, we generally rely on the tax 
court's findings of fact as they are neither challenged nor 
clearly erroneous.  See Kenagy v. United States, 942 F.2d 459, 
463 (9th Cir. 1991).  Where necessary, we also rely on undisputed 
evidence in the record on appeal. 
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 This case involves the propriety of deductions that the 
Nicholsons claimed in regard to the purchase of certain computer 
equipment.  Nicholson0 acquired the equipment in 1983 from its 
original purchaser, Equipment Leasing Exchange, Inc. ("ELEX"). 
Nicholson v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1994-280 at 3 (1994).  ELEX 
had purchased the equipment in 1983 for $362,168.  Id.  In order 
to finance the purchase, ELEX obtained two nonrecourse loans from 
the Hershey Bank ("the Bank").  Id.  ELEX subsequently leased the 
equipment to the Milton Hershey School ("the School") for a term 
of six years.  Id.  The lease provided for monthly rental income 
of $7,478.  Id.  As a condition of the two loans, ELEX granted 
the Bank a security interest in the computer equipment and the 
lease.  Id. 
 Nicholson purchased the lease and the equipment from ELEX for 
$386,798.  Id.  In partial payment of the purchase price, 
Nicholson executed and delivered to ELEX three promissory notes, 
in the amounts of $17,500, $20,378, and $336,195.  Id.  The first 
two notes were payable on March 15, 1984, and March 15, 1985, 
respectively.  Id.   Both notes explicitly provided ELEX a right 
of recourse against Nicholson personally in the case of default. 
Id.  The third note required repayment in monthly installments of 
$7,348.80.  Id. at 4.  Unlike the first two notes, however, the 
third note was silent as to whether ELEX had a right of recourse 
                                                           
0Both Charles Nicholson and his wife, Margaret Nicholson are 
parties to this action by virtue of filing joint tax returns. All 
the transactions at issue here, however, involve only Charles 
Nicholson.  For convenience, "Nicholson," when used in the 
singular, refers only to Charles Nicholson. 
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against Nicholson.  Id.  All three notes were secured by the 
equipment and the lease, subject to the Bank's priority security 
interest.  Id. 
 In 1991, the Internal Revenue Service ("IRS") audited the 
Nicholsons' 1983, 1984, 1985, and 1986 tax returns.  Initially, 
the IRS District Director took the position that deductions 
claimed by the Nicholsons with regard to the leasing activity 
should be disallowed because the leasing activity was not an 
activity entered into for profit since it had no economic or 
business purpose.  Joint Appendix ("JA") at 62-65.  The 
Nicholsons appealed this determination to the IRS Appeals Office. 
Id. at 65.   
 The Appeals Office agreed with the Nicholsons' argument that 
the leasing activity did have an economic purpose.  Id.  However, 
the Appeals Office sua sponte raised an alternative basis for 
denying the Nicholsons' deductions.  The Appeals Office ruled 
that Nicholson was not "at risk" within the meaning of I.R.C. 
§465 as to the money borrowed under the third note.  Id.  
Pursuant to section 465, an owner of depreciable property may 
only deduct up to the total amount of the economic investment in 
the property (i.e., the amount that is "at risk").   
 Subsequently, on December 11, 1991, the Commissioner issued a 
Notice of Deficiency to the Nicholsons.  Like the Appeals Office, 
the Commissioner asserted that the Nicholsons' deductions were 
barred by section 465's "at risk" requirement.  According to the 
Commissioner, Nicholson was not "at risk" as to the third note 1) 
because it was nonrecourse; 2) because ELEX did not borrow funds 
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on a recourse basis from the Bank on its purchase of the 
equipment and therefore ELEX would have no motive to pursue 
Nicholson if he defaulted on the third note; and 3) because the 
lease payments from the School were sufficient to cover the 
installment payments required under the third note.  Id. at 64-
65; see id. at 121-25; Nicholson, T.C. Memo. 1994-280 at 7-8 n.7. 
 The deficiencies were for income taxes for the calendar years 
1983, 1984, 1985, and 1986 in the amounts of $3,660, $25,179, 
$20,385, and $21,180 respectively.  Nicholson, T.C. Memo. 1994-
280 at 2.  The Commissioner also assessed an interest penalty 
against the Nicholsons under I.R.C. § 6621(c), believing that the 
underpayment was due to a tax-motivated transaction.  Id. 
 The Nicholsons then filed a Petition for Redetermination with 
the tax court on February 14, 1992.  On February 1, 1994, the 
parties filed a Stipulation of Settled Issues ("the Settlement") 
with the Tax Court that provided: 
 The Parties hereby agree to the following 
settlement of the issues in the above-entitled case: 
 
 1.  It is agreed for purposes of settlement that 
petitioners' claimed losses with respect to their 
activity in the Hershey transaction during the years 
1983 through 1985 shall be disallowed subject to their 
deductibility as provided below; 
 
 2.  It is agreed for settlement purposes that 
petitioners were at risk as defined under I.R.C. 
Section 465 on the installment note in the amount of 
$336,195.00 with respect to their activity in the 
Hershey transaction beginning in 1986 and are entitled 
to suspended losses beginning in 1986; 
 
 3.  It is agreed for purposes of settlement that 
petitioners are required to include in taxable income 
for taxable year ended December 31, 1983 the amount of 
$18,300.00 which represents the amount of Schedule E 
6 
loss disallowed on petitioners' investment in Hershey 
and Cyclops0 in 1983; 
 
 4.  It is agreed for the settlement that 
petitioners are required to include in taxable income 
for taxable year ended December 31, 1984 the amount of 
$42,024.00 which represents the amount of Schedule E 
loss disallowed on petitioners' investment in Hershey 
and Cyclops in 1983; 
 
 5.  It is agreed for the settlement that 
petitioners are required to include in taxable income 
for taxable year ended December 31, 1985 the amount of 
$72,341.00 which represents the amount of Schedule E 
loss disallowed on petitioners' investment in Hershey 
and Cyclops in 1983; 
 
 6.  It is agreed for the settlement that for the 
taxable year ended December 31, 1986, petitioners are 
entitled to deduct $81,723.00 with respect to their 
investment in the Hershey transaction as a suspended 
loss under I.R.C. Section 465; 
 
 7.  It is agreed for purposes of settlement that 
respondent concedes increased interest under I.R.C. 
Section 6621(c), formerly, 6621(d) for all issue years. 
 
Id. at 4-5. 
 The net effect of this Settlement was that the Nicholsons 
were not able to take the deductions claimed in 1983, 1984, and 
1985, but were able to carry these amounts forward and take them 
as a deduction in 1986.0  In addition, the Nicholsons were not 
liable for an increased interest penalty under section 6621(c). 
The Settlement was therefore quite favorable to the Nicholsons. 
                                                           
0The "Cyclops" issue is an unrelated matter that was not 
contested by the Nicholsons.  According to the tax court, the 
Commissioner conceded that it was not a significant issue.  See 
Nicholson, T.C. Memo. 1994-280 at 5 n.3. 
0A taxpayer does not forfeit a deduction due to the operation of 
section 465's "at risk" requirement.  Rather the deduction 
becomes suspended and may be taken when the taxpayer actually 
becomes "at risk" for the amount of the deduction.  See I.R.C. 
§465(a)(2). 
7 
Although the Commissioner's Notice of Deficiency alleged that 
Nicholson owed over $70,000 for the 1983-1986 period, under the 
Settlement the Nicholsons appear to have been assessed only a net 
deficiency of between $2,500 and $4,000.0  Id. at 6 & n.4.   
 The Commissioner's willingness to settle on these terms 
appears due to two significant developments.  First, the 
Commissioner changed her position on whether the third note 
provided for recourse.  Although the Commissioner initially 
maintained that because this note was silent as to recourse the 
underlying loan was nonrecourse, the Commissioner abandoned this 
theory because New Jersey law, which controls the terms of the 
note, clearly provides that a note is presumptively recourse. Id. 
at 7-8 n.7; JA at 125; see N.J. Stat. Ann. § 12A:9-505(2). 
Second, after issuing the Notice of Deficiency, the Commissioner 
learned that ELEX in 1986 had fully repaid its loan to the Bank. 
JA at 125; Brief for the Appellee ("Comm. Br.") at 20 n.7.  Thus, 
the Commissioner conceded that Nicholson was at risk as of 1986 
because ELEX would have certainly exercised its right of recourse 
against Nicholson for any default by Nicholson on the third 
note.0 
                                                           
0Although not clear from the Settlement or the record, it seems 
that the only benefit that the Commissioner received from the 
Settlement was that the Nicholsons had to pay interest (but not a 
penalty) on the deductions that they claimed for 1983, 1984, and 
1985 until they were able to take these deductions in 1986.  In 
other words, because the Settlement disallowed the Nicholsons' 
deductions in 1983, 1984, and 1985, but allowed them to carry 
these deductions forward and take them in 1986, the Nicholsons 
owed interest for having use of the money for a period when they 
were not entitled to it. 
0Nicholson, however, did not concede in the Settlement that he 
was not "at risk" in 1983, 1984, and 1985. 
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 Following the Settlement, the Nicholsons filed a motion to 
recover their litigation costs pursuant to I.R.C. § 7430.  After 
surveying the background of this litigation, the tax court began 
its analysis by observing that in order to be entitled to an 
award of costs, the Nicholsons needed to demonstrate that they 
were a "prevailing party" as defined by section 74300 and that 
they complied with that provision's procedural requirements.0 
Nicholson, T.C. Memo. 1994-280 at 6.  Thus, the Nicholsons needed 
to establish that: 
(1) [t]hey exhausted all administrative remedies, (2) 
they met the net worth requirement of section 
7430(c)(4)(A)(iii), (3) they ha[d] substantially 
prevailed with respect to the amount in controversy or 
most significant issues, and (4) the position of the 
United States was "not substantially justified." 
 
                                                           
0I.R.C. § 7430(a) provides for the award of "reasonable 
administrative costs" and "reasonable litigation costs" to a 
"prevailing party" in connection "with the determination . . . of 
any tax."  I.R.C. § 7430(c)(4)(A) defines a "prevailing party" as 
a party:  
 
  (i) which establishes that the position of the United 
States in the proceedings was not substantially 
justified, 
 
  (ii) which-- 
 
  (I) has substantially prevailed with respect to 
the amount in controversy, or 
 
  (II) has substantially prevailed with respect to 
the most significant issue or set of issues 
presented, and 
 
  (iii) [is an individual whose net worth does not 
exceed $2,000,000 at the time the civil action was 
filed]. 
0I.R.C. § 7430(b) requires that an award of litigation costs 
"shall not be awarded . . . unless the court determines the 
prevailing party has exhausted the administrative remedies 
available to such a party within the Internal Revenue Service."   
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Id. (emphasis in original). 
 The tax court found that the Nicholsons had met the first two 
conditions.  Id.  Turning to the third condition, the tax court 
noted that the Commissioner's brief merely stated that the 
Nicholsons "may in fact be able to prove that they meet the 
alternative requirement of that condition namely the amount in 
controversy or the most significant issues."  Id.  Although the 
tax court appeared to indicate that the Nicholsons had satisfied 
this condition by virtue of the small net deficiency assessed 
against them under the Settlement and the Commissioner's apparent 
waiver, the court decided not to resolve this issue because it 
believed that the fourth condition was determinative.  Id. 
 As to the fourth condition, the tax court noted that a 
determination of whether the Commissioner's position was not 
substantially justified depends upon an  
examination of all the facts and circumstances to 
determine if that position had a reasonable basis in 
law and fact.  Price v. Commissioner, [T.C. Memo. 1995-
187 at 3 (1994)].  Petitioners bear the burden of 
proof.  [Tax Court] Rule 232(e); Estate of Wall v. 
Commissioner, 102 T.C. 391, 393 (1994). 
 
Id. at 7.  The tax court therefore focused its attention on the 
arguments that each party had advanced in the underlying 
proceeding on the issue of whether Nicholson was at risk on the 
third note.  As noted above, the Commissioner, after conceding 
that the third note provided ELEX with the right of recourse 
against Nicholson personally, see id. at 7-8 n.7, nevertheless 
continued to assert that Nicholson was not "at risk" because (1) 
the obligations of ELEX to the Bank were nonrecourse and (2) the 
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lease payments from Hershey nearly offset Nicholson's obligation 
to ELEX.  In particular, the Commissioner relied on a number of 
cases in which these two elements were present and taxpayers were 
found not to be "at risk."  Id. at 7.  The Nicholsons, on the 
other hand, maintained that these two elements were not by 
themselves dispositive in the "at risk" analysis.  Id. at 8. 
Rather, the Nicholsons argued that ELEX would have exercised its 
right of recourse on the third note if the transaction had become 
unprofitable.  Id. 
 The tax court found that the Commissioner's position was 
substantially justified.  The tax court wrote:  
 [The Commissioner] relies on the galaxy of cases 
where the two elements relied upon by [the Nicholsons] 
were present and where the taxpayers therein were held 
not to be at risk.  Those cases, as well as other cases 
cited by [the Commissioner], are analyzed in some 
detail in Thornock v. Commissioner, [94 T.C. 439, 453 
(1990)], and Wag-A-Bag Inc. v. Commissioner, [T.C. 
Memo. 1992-581 (1994)], which analyses reveal that 
those cases involved elements in addition to the 
presence of nonrecourse obligations at an earlier stage 
and offsetting payments.  Thus, the message which such 
cases convey is murky at best.  In any event, we are 
not prepared to say that they do not furnish some basis 
for [the Commissioner's] position on the substantive 
issue involved herein. 
 
Id. at 8-9.  The court then concluded: 
 In short, the two elements upon which the parties 
herein have focused their arguments are not 
automatically dispositive of the "at risk" issue.  Two 
non per se elements do not amount to one per se element 
either for or against [the Nicholsons].  To be sure, it 
is entirely possible that, had the instant case gone to 
decision on the substantive risk issue, we would have 
resolved that issue in favor of [the Nicholsons].  But 
that result would not have necessarily entitled 
petitioners to recover litigation costs under section 
7430.  It is clearly established that the fact that the 
respondent loses a significant issue, whether by 
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concession or after trial, is not determinative that 
her position was reasonable.  Price v. Commissioner, 
supra. 
 
* * *  
 
 The long and the short of the matter is that, 
taking into account all the facts and circumstances 
herein, we are not persuaded that [the Nicholsons] have 
carried their burden under section 7430. 
 
Id. at 9, 11. 
 This appeal followed. 
  
II. 
 We begin with the main issue of contention between the 
litigants.  In order to demonstrate that the position taken by 
the United States was not "substantially justified," the 
Nicholsons have the burden of showing that the government's 
position was not "justified to a degree that could satisfy a 
reasonable person" or had no "reasonable basis both in law and 
fact . . . ."  Lennox v. Commissioner, 998 F.2d 244, 248 (5th 
Cir. 1993) (quoting Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 563-565 
(1988)); see 26 C.F.R. § 301.74305-5(c); see also Rickel v. 
Commissioner, 900 F.2d  655, 666 (3d Cir. 1990) (rejecting a 
taxpayer's claim for costs award where "Commissioner's position 
could be deemed as reasonably supported in the case law").  The 
Nicholsons' burden is also increased by this court's standard of 
review:  the tax court's denial of a taxpayer's motion for an 
award of costs under section 7430 is reviewed for an abuse of 
discretion.  Rickel, 900 F.2d at 666; Accord Pierce, 487 U.S. 
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563-65 (abuse of discretion review proper for awards under the 
Equal Access to Justice Act).   
 We will structure our discussion of this issue as follows. In 
Part II.A., we will analyze I.R.C. § 465, the code provision upon 
which the Commissioner relied in assessing the deficiency against 
the Nicholsons.  In Part II.B., we will examine the position 
taken by the Commissioner in the underlying litigation (i.e., the 
theory advocated by the Commissioner in support of the deficiency 
assessment).  Finally, In Part II.C., we will determine whether 
the Commissioner's position was reasonable in light of the 
substantive law and consequently whether the tax court abused its 
discretion in denying the Nicholsons' motion for costs. 
 
 A.  I.R.C. § 465 limits the ability of taxpayers to claim 
deductions resulting from the ownership of depreciable property. 
Section 465 was enacted because of the proliferation of tax 
shelters in the 1970's.  Before the enactment of section 465, 
investors could take advantage of quick depreciation rules plus 
the deductibility of interest on nonrecourse debt to generate 
large "losses" in order to offset personal income.0 
                                                           
0Professor Chirelstein provides the following lucid explanation 
of the way in which these tax shelters operated: 
 
 In conventional form, the shelter consists of 
highly leveraged real estate in which individual 
investors participate as limited partners.  The limited 
partners make initial cash payments to the shelter 
promoters which are largely absorbed by commissions, 
fees and similar charges, while the cost of the 
property itself is financed through a mortgage loan 
from a bank, insurance company or other institution. 
The loan is nonrecourse, but, under the Crane rule, the 
13 
 Section 465 attacks these practices directly.  Pursuant to 
section 465, a taxpayer may only take deductions up to the amount 
"at risk" in the activity.  A taxpayer is considered to be at 
risk for the amount "contributed" to the activity and for the 
amount of money "borrowed" for use in the activity.  I.R.C. 
§465(b)(1).  However, for purposes of section 465, an amount is 
considered borrowed only if the taxpayer is either "personally 
liable for repayment" or has pledged other personal property as 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
limited partners are entitled to treat the borrowed 
amount as if it were a personal loan and hence, to 
include the indebtedness in basis.  Rents received by 
the partnership are then expected to cover mortgage 
principal and interest requirements plus management 
fees.  Sometimes, but not always, there is a small 
annual cash return to the investors. 
 
 [T]he combination of (a) accelerated depreciation 
and (b) deductible interest on the nonrecourse mortgage 
loan inevitably generates substantial "losses" during 
the earlier years of the enterprise.  Such losses are 
of course tax artifacts.  If true economic depreciation 
were substituted for accelerated depreciation, then, 
usually, the enterprise would operate at or close to a 
break-even level--there would be no deductible "loss" 
to report--and the investment from the standpoint of 
the limited partnership would have little purpose.  The 
same result would arise if (while leaving accelerated 
depreciation untouched) otherwise deductible interest 
were deferred or disallowed as under Code § 265(a)(2). 
In fact, however, nether limitation was imposed. 
Instead, high-bracket taxpayers were enabled 
(encouraged) to combine tax-exempt income with tax-
deductible borrowing and, by so doing, to reduce their 
taxable income to a minimum.  The "loss" resulting from 
the shelter investment would be offset against income 
from other sources (chiefly personal services), even 
though the taxpayer himself would have lost little or 
nothing in economic terms. 
 
Marvin A. Chirelstein, Federal Income Taxation 259-60 (6th ed. 
1991). 
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"security for the borrowed amount (to the extent of the net fair 
market value of the taxpayer's interest in such property)."  Id. 
at § 465(b)(2)(A) and (B).  Section 465 also contains a catch-all 
provision that provides: 
Notwithstanding any other provision of this section, a 
taxpayer will not be considered at risk with respect to 
the amounts protected against loss through nonrecourse 
financing, guarantees, stop loss agreements, or other 
similar arrangements. 
 
Id. at § 465(b)(4) (emphasis added).  The Commissioner--conceding 
that the note that Nicholson gave to ELEX was recourse and 
moreover, that he was not protected by any guarantees or stop 
loss agreements--argued in the proceedings below that the 
peculiarities of the leasing agreement involved "other similar 
arrangements" sufficient to render him immune from any risk. 
 Although the Internal Revenue Code does not define the term 
"other similar arrangements," the meaning of this phrase has been 
addressed by several other courts of appeals.  The majority of 
these courts have applied the "economic reality" test to 
determine whether a taxpayer is protected from loss by "other 
similar arrangements."  Under this approach, a transaction is 
deemed not "at risk" if it is structured "to remove any realistic 
possibility that the taxpayer will suffer an economic loss if the 
transaction turns out to be unprofitable."  American Principals 
Leasing Corp. v. United States, 904 F.2d 477, 483 (9th Cir. 
1990).  See also Waters v. Commissioner, 978 F.2d 1310, 1315 (2d 
Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1814 (1993); Young v. 
Commissioner, 926 F.2d 1083, 1088 n.11 (11th Cir. 1991); Moser v. 
15 
Commissioner, 914 F.2d 1040, 1048 (8th Cir. 1990).  The Sixth 
Circuit, by contrast, has employed the "worst case scenario" test 
to determine whether a taxpayer is protected from loss by an 
"other similar arrangement."  Martuccio v. Commissioner, 30 F.3d 
743, 749 (6th Cir. 1994).  This test is more favorable to 
taxpayers than the economic reality test, as it holds that a 
taxpayer is "at risk" unless there are no circumstances in which 
he could suffer a loss in the transaction.  Id.  Although this 
court has yet to address this issue, we agree with the 
Commissioner that the reasonableness of her position should be 
evaluated under the economic reality test as it has been adopted 
by the overwhelming majority of the courts to address the issue. 
Whether or not we would adopt in a case in which we were required 
to decide whether certain deductions were proper, we believe that 
if the Commissioner satisfied the economic reality test here, her 
position had a reasonable basis in law.0 
 B.  We now turn to the position taken by the Commissioner in 
the proceedings below.0  As noted, the Commissioner asserted that 
Nicholson was not "at risk" on the amount of the third note 
                                                           
0We emphasize that we do not purport to adopt the economic 
reality test as the law of this circuit. 
0In this context, the "position of the United States" is the 
position taken by the Commissioner in the underlying tax court 
proceeding and, with respect to an administrative proceeding 
before the IRS, the position taken by the IRS as of the earlier 
of the date of the Notice of Deficiency or the date of receipt by 
the taxpayer of the Notice of Decision by the Appeals Office. 
I.R.C. § 7430(c)(7).  Because the record does not show that the 
Nicholsons received a Notice of Decision by the Appeals Office, 
the inquiry as to the position asserted by the United States 
begins at the time that the Nicholsons receive the Notice of 
Deficiency.     
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because the structure of the leasing arrangement was an "other 
similar arrangement" within the meaning of section 465(b)(4). 
After abandoning the position that the third note was 
nonrecourse, the Commissioner relied on two separate aspects of 
the leasing agreement to support this argument.  First, the 
Commissioner pointed to the fact that the rental payments due 
from the School on its lease were almost exactly the same amount 
as the monthly payments Nicholson owed ELEX under the terms of 
the third note.  Second, the Commissioner pointed to the fact 
that the loan between the Bank and ELEX was nonrecourse and that 
the Bank had a priority security interest on the equipment. 
According to the Commissioner, these two factors were sufficient 
to demonstrate that Nicholson was not "at risk" on the third note 
for the following reasons:   
 It is evident, therefore, that the School was the 
ultimate obligor for the payments that would be used 
for the purchase of the computer equipment and that 
would be received by the Bank, as the ultimate obligee. 
In other words, at the end of the day the School owed 
rent to taxpayer, who would use those rental payments 
to satisfy his obligations on the note to ELEX, which, 
in turn, would use those payments to satisfy the 
obligations to the Bank.  Taxpayer was merely the 
conduit through which payments made by the School were 
funnelled to their ultimate destination, the Bank.  If 
the School, the end user, ever stopped paying rent to 
taxpayer, then the Bank would not be paid.  Since 
ELEX's note to the Bank was nonrecourse, the Bank's 
sole remedy would be to foreclose on the computer 
equipment.  In that event, ELEX would have suffered no 
economic loss, and therefore would have no incentive to 
pursue the taxpayer for payment on his $366,195 note. 
In these circumstances, it was reasonable to maintain, 
as the Commissioner did until the settlement of this 
case, that there was no "realistic possibility" that 
the taxpayer would suffer a loss on that note. 
 
17 
Comm. Br. at 17 (emphasis added).  The Commissioner, however, did 
concede in the underlying proceedings that even under this theory 
that Nicholson was "at risk" on the third note after 1986, when 
ELEX paid off its loan from the Bank.  Id. at 20 & n.7. 
 
 C.  In light of this understanding of section 465 and the 
theory underlying the Commissioner's position, we now assess the 
reasonableness of her position.  We find that the Commissioner's 
position is not supported in law or fact and is therefore 
unjustified.   
 We understand the Commissioner's theory as follows.  Should 
the School default on the lease or refuse to meet its contractual 
obligations on account of a dispute regarding the computer 
equipment--both realistic possibilities in any business 
transaction like this one--Nicholson would be unable to pay ELEX. 
ELEX in turn might not then pay the Bank, causing the Bank to 
respond by foreclosing on the equipment itself, as it had no 
right of recourse against ELEX.  With this much, we agree. 
However, the Commissioner goes on to argue that ELEX would not 
pursue Nicholson for his failure to repay the third note because 
ELEX suffered no "economic loss," as the Bank was forced to 
foreclose on the equipment rather than sue ELEX directly.  We 
find no support in logic for this argument.  Although ELEX could 
conceivably suffer no economic loss as a result of Nicholson's 
inability to make his payments under the third note, ELEX would 
still have incentive to sue Nicholson and obtain the outstanding 
balance of the note (which could amount to several hundred 
18 
thousand dollars).0  Thus, the Commissioner's theory does not 
provide any reason why ELEX would fail to act like an ordinary 
creditor in this situation and enforce the outstanding obligation 
owed to it by Nicholson. 
 Furthermore, the Commissioner's critical assumption that ELEX 
would suffer no "economic loss" is without foundation in the 
record.  ELEX could have chosen to make larger payments than 
required under the terms of its loan from the Bank in order to 
pay-off the loan early.  Indeed, this appears to have happened 
                                                           
0At oral argument, counsel for the Commissioner asserted, for the 
first time, that ELEX would not want to enforce the terms of the 
third note in the case of a default by Hershey and Nicholson 
because this would give ELEX an unfavorable reputation in the 
community and therefore ELEX would be unable to engage in this 
type of transaction in the future.  Because this argument was 
neither presented to the tax court nor in the Commissioner's 
brief, we need not consider it on appeal.  See Lim v. Central 
DuPage Hosp., 871 F.2d 644, 648 (7th Cir. 1989) ("oral argument 
in this court . . . [is] too late for advancing new (or what is 
the same thing, reviving abandoned" argument)).  Moreover, there 
is absolutely no support in the record for this assertion.  As 
the tax court observed in Powers v. Commissioner, 100 T.C. 457, 
473 (1993), the Commissioner's position "lack[s] a reasonable 
basis in fact and law" when it has "no factual basis and [the 
Commissioner has] made no attempt to obtain information about the 
case before adopting the position."  
 
 We also note that counsel for the Nicholsons persuasively 
responded that ELEX would have incentive to pursue Nicholson for 
the outstanding value of the third note in the case of default. 
First, a portion of the third note represents the profits due to 
ELEX from the sale of the equipment and lease, and ELEX would 
certainly be entitled to this amount.  Second, in order to 
maintain its ability to borrow on a nonrecourse basis from the 
Bank, ELEX would have incentive to act as an agent for the Bank 
and make sure that the Bank had not lost money as a result of the 
transaction.  In the case of quickly obsolescent property such as 
computer equipment, the Bank's security interest in the equipment 
could easily be insufficient to cover the outstanding balance of 
its loan to ELEX.  Thus, ELEX would have incentive to sue 
Nicholson for the shortfall. 
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here, as ELEX prepaid the loan from the Bank.  In such a case, 
the proceeds from the Bank's repossession and sale of the 
equipment (minus the Bank's priority security interest) would not 
necessarily be sufficient to cover ELEX's extra payments.  Thus, 
the record provided the Commissioner with no basis for presuming 
that ELEX would not suffer any economic loss should the lease 
have become unprofitable.  See Lennox, 998 F.2d at 248-49 
(Commissioner's position must be supported by record evidence in 
order to be substantially justified). 
 The inadequacy of the Commissioner's position is apparently 
due to her failure to properly develop the case against the 
Nicholsons before issuing the Notice of Deficiency.0  The 
Commissioner cannot have a "reasonable basis in both fact and law 
if it does not diligently investigate a case."  Powers v. 
Commissioner, 100 T.C. 457, 473 (1993); see United States v. 
Estridge, 797 F.2d 1454, 1458 (8th Cir. 1986) (award for 
litigation costs granted where Commissioner did not diligently 
investigate).  When issuing the Notice of Deficiency, the 
Commissioner believed--incorrectly--that the third note between 
ELEX and Nicholson was nonrecourse because it was silent on its 
face as to recourse while the other two notes explicitly provided 
for recourse.  See JA at 125.  Even a cursory analysis of New 
                                                           
0The Commissioner argues that anything that happened before the 
Notice of Deficiency is irrelevant to this case because under 
I.R.C. § 7430(c)(7), the position of the Commissioner is 
determined only after the date of the Notice of Deficiency.  We 
disagree.  As the Fifth Circuit explained in Lennox, 998 F.2d at 
248, the sufficiency of the position taken by the Commissioner 
after the Notice of Deficiency must be analyzed in the context of 
what caused her to take that position.   
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Jersey law would have revealed the deficiency in this position. 
See N.J. Stat. Ann. § 12A:9-505(2).  Given the logical weakness 
of the theory eventually relied upon by the Commissioner, we are 
skeptical that the Notice would have been issued had the 
Commissioner been accurately appraised of New Jersey law. 
 Moreover, the Commissioner's position at the time of the 
Notice of Deficiency with regard to the Nicholsons' 1986 tax 
deduction was clearly not justified.  In the Notice, the 
Commissioner maintained that Nicholson was not at risk in 1986. 
However, the Commissioner later conceded that because ELEX paid 
off the Bank in 1986, Nicholson was "at risk" at that time.  The 
Commissioner could have discovered this fact had she adequately 
investigated the case before issuing the Notice.0  See Portillo 
v. Commissioner, 988 F.2d 27, 29 (5th Cir. 1993) (ruling that a 
Notice of Deficiency without any factual foundation is "clearly 
erroneous as a matter of law"). 
 The Commissioner seeks to overcome these deficiencies and 
justify the reasonableness of her position by citing a number of 
cases in which courts found that a taxpayer who borrowed money as 
part of a complex leasing transaction was not "at risk" for the 
borrowed amount.  See Waters, 978 F.2d at 1317; Young, 926 F.2d 
at 1088 n.11 (11th Cir. 1991); Moser, 914 F.2d at 1048; American 
Principals Leasing Corp., 904 F.2d at 483; see also Thornock v. 
                                                           
0The Commissioner can hardly blame the Nicholsons for not 
providing her with this information because the "at risk" issue 
was raised by the Appeals Office sua sponte, and no further 
investigation appears to have been conducted before the Notice 
was issued.  JA at 65-66. 
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Commissioner, 94 T.C. 439 (1990); Wag-A-Bag, Inc. v. 
Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1992-581 (1992).  The Commissioner 
correctly notes that in these cases, the two factors eventually 
relied upon by the Commissioner were relevant to the 
determination of whether an amount was "at risk."  However, the 
determinative factor in these cases was that the parties, through 
the use of nonrecourse financing and lease assignments, were able 
to create a circular web of offsetting liabilities, thereby 
effectively removing risk from the taxpayer claiming the 
deduction.  See Waters, 978 F.2d at 1317 ("circular, matching 
payment obligations"); Young, 926 F.2d at 1083 ("circular 
sale/leaseback transactions"); Moser, 914 F.2d at 1049 ("circular 
nature of the arrangement" and "offsetting bookkeeping entries"); 
American Principals Leasing Corp., 904 F.2d at 483 ("circular 
obligations" and "chain of payments"); see generally Thomas A. 
Pliskin, How Circular Transactions and Certain Interests of 
Lenders Affect Amounts of Risk, 12 J. Partnership Tax. 54, 63-66 
(1995) (arguing that the courts in Moser, Young and American 
Principals Leasing correctly determined the taxpayers were not at 
risk because circular chains of payments were used to protect the 
taxpayers from loss).   
 A brief example (drawn from Moser, supra) will clarify the 
type of transaction at issue in the cases relied upon by the 
Commissioner and provide a contrast with the type at issue here. 
Assume A borrows money on a nonrecourse basis from a bank and 
uses that money to buy some equipment.  A leases that equipment 
to L and the bank then takes a security interest in that 
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equipment and the lease.  A sells the equipment to B, subject to 
the existing liens and lease and takes a promissory note from B. 
B in turn sells to taxpayer, T, for the same price that it bought 
the equipment from A.  Like before, B accepts a promissory note 
from T as payment.  T, in turn, leases the equipment back to A in 
exchange for payments equal to those B owes to A.  
 Under this arrangement, the payments A owes to T are 
identical to the payments T owes to B, which in turn are 
identical to the payments B owes to A.  T, as the "owner" of the 
equipment, would be entitled to take deductions for depreciation 
of the property (except for the existence of section 465). Should 
any party assert a claim against another party for nonpayment, it 
could expect an equal claim asserted against it. See Pliskin, 
supra, at 62-66, 72 (diagramming this type of transaction).  
Here, by contrast, there was no circular chain of payments.  
Instead, the failure of Nicholson to meet the terms of the third 
note would trigger a demand for payment by ELEX; Nicholson, on 
the other hand, would have no corresponding claim against ELEX or 
the Bank.   
 Given this analysis, we are forced to conclude that the tax 
court abused its discretion in ruling that the Commissioner's 
position was substantially justified.  As noted, the tax court 
did not seek to analyze whether Nicholson would suffer an 
economic loss if the lease became unprofitable.  The court simply 
found that because two of the factors present in this case were 
also present in several of the cases finding taxpayers not "at 
risk," the Commissioner's position was substantially justified. 
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Thus, the court did not seek to determine why the taxpayers in 
these cases were found not "at risk."  Had the court conducted 
the required economic reality test, it would have found that 
these two factors were not dispositive in this transaction 
because ELEX had incentive to sue Nicholson in the case of a 
default on the third note.  
 
III.  
 The only remaining issue therefore is whether to remand for a 
determination of whether the Nicholsons substantially prevailed 
in the underlying case, a necessary condition for the award of 
litigation costs under section 7430.0  The tax court, as noted, 
did not rule on this issue.  We do not, however, believe such a 
remand is necessary.   
 On appeal, the Commissioner has not attempted to sustain the 
tax court's ruling on the alternative basis that the Nicholsons 
did not substantially prevail.  Nor did she press this issue 
before the tax court.  See supra page 9.  Rather, the sole 
argument advanced before this court by the Commissioner was that 
her position was "substantially justified."  Moreover, the great 
disparity between the deficiency assessed by the Commissioner and 
the Nicholsons' tax liability after the Settlement reflected in 
the record indicates that the Nicholsons have "substantially 
prevailed with respect to the amount in controversy."  I.R.C. 
                                                           
0Pursuant to section 7430(c)(4)(A)(ii), a party substantially 
prevails by either substantially prevailing "with respect to the 
amount in controversy" or "with respect to the most significant 
issue or set of issues presented."   
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§7430(c)(4); see Marranca v. United States, 615 F. Supp. 25, 27 
(M.D. Pa. 1985) (government conceded that taxpayers 
"substantially prevailed with respect to the amount in 
controversy" after parties reached settlement reducing initial 
assessment by nearly 75%).  Thus, we conclude that the Nicholsons 
have met all the requirements of section 7430, and we therefore 
remand this case to the tax court for a determination of the 
costs and fees to which they are entitled.   
 
IV. 
 For the foregoing reasons, the tax court's order denying the 
Nicholsons' petition for costs is reversed and remanded for 
proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
